CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-ALL CLAIMS
OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN SEIZING FREE CITIZENS ANALYZED
UNDER OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS STANDARD-Graham v.

Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated . . . ." The United States Supreme Court has long
interpreted the fourth amendment as proscribing unreasonable
seizures by federal actors.2 In 1961, the Court determined that
the fourth amendment was applicable to state officials as well.3
Subsequently, the Court extended the amendment's zone of protection to any restraint on the liberty of a citizen. 4 Although the
fourth amendment's reasonableness standard should govern all
seizures of the person,5 the majority of federal circuit and district
courts have utilized a fourteenth amendment due process analysis in addressing all excessive force claims brought against law
enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6
The lower federal courts' use of a substantive due process
standard appears to be a relic of the days before the fourth
amendment was made applicable to the states.7 The United
States Supreme Court has continued to apply the fourth amend'

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

2 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 26 (1949).
3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5 See id. at 19 n.16.
6 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989) (citing Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE L.J. 692, 694-96, & nn.16-23 (surveying excessive
force cases)).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
subjects, or causes to be subjected,
custom, or usage, of any State ...
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
7 See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973) (use of due process standard to review excessive force claim brought
by pre-trial detainee against guard of detention facility).
The court of appeals in Glick relied upon the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which was decided before the
fourth and fifth amendments were made applicable to the states. Glick, 481 F.2d at
1032-33. In Rochin, the Court used the due process clause of the fourteenth
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ment standard whenever there is a claim of excessive force in
making a seizure.8 Recently, the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Connor 9 announced that the fourth amendment standard of objective reasonableness must be applied by the courts whenever
they are confronted with claims alleging that law enforcement
personnel have utilized excessive force in making an investigatory stop, arrest, or other seizure of a free citizen.' ° Thus, whenever a free citizen is accosted by a law enforcement official, he
can invoke the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. "
In 1984, Dethorne Graham was subjected to an investigatory
stop of the vehicle in which he was riding.' 2 Prior to the stop,
Graham, a diabetic, entered a convenience store to purchase
some juice in an attempt to counteract an insulin reaction. 13
When he went into the store, he observed several people in the
check-out line ahead of him.' 4 Concerned about the delay in obtaining the juice, he quickly left the store to get the juice elsewhere.' 5 His rapid departure from the store aroused the
suspicion of Officer Connor of the Charlotte, North Carolina Police Department.' 6 Officer Connor detained Graham while he
determined what had happened at the store; meanwhile several
other officers arrived on the scene in response to Connor's request for backup.' 7 The officers, despite being told Graham was
suffering from a sugar reaction, mistook his behavior for drunkenness. 18 Consequently, the officers handcuffed Graham, placed
him face down on the hood of the car, and forcibly put him into
amendment to void a state conviction where the evidence was obtained by pumping
the defendant's stomach. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
8 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
9 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
10 Id. at 1871.
II Id. at 1867.
12 Id. at 1868.
3 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that
"[flor a diabetic such as Graham a reaction caused by a drop in blood sugar can
cause nausea, dizziness, and disorientation. Left untreated the reaction can lead to
coma or even death." Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 946 (4th Cir.
1987), vacated sub nom. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
14 Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1868.
15 Id.
16 Id.

Id.
Id. Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that during the encounter
Graham had requested some sugar and "asked the officers to check in his wallet for
a diabetic decal that he carried." Id. The officers, however, did not permit Graham
to drink orange juice that a friend had brought. Id.
17
18
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the police car. 9 Upon learning that nothing had happened at the
store, the officers drove Graham home and released him.2" During the course of the encounter Graham received several physical
injuries. 2 ' Graham subsequently brought suit in federal court in
the Western District of North Carolina against the officers and
the City of Charlotte, North Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.22 Graham alleged that the officers had used excessive
force in violation of his rights under the fourteenth amendment
and § 1983.23
The United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina granted the officers' motion for a directed verdict
at the close of Graham's evidence. 4 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the substantive due process test applied to all constitutional excessive force
claims. 2 5 Realizing that the majority of the circuit courts were
improperly applying the due process test to all § 1983 damage
claims,2 6 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 27 The Graham
majority ruled that all § 1983 claims of excessive force are not
governed by a single generic standard, however, all claims that
law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of
making a seizure of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the
fourth amendment's objective reasonableness standard.28 Thus,
the Court ruled that a § 1983 claimant, such as Graham, need
only establish that the force used to effect the seizure was objectively unreasonable.2 9
To fully appreciate the Court's holding in Graham, it is essen19 Id.
Id.

20

21 Id. Specifically, "Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised
forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing

in his right ear that continues to this day." Id.
22 Id. Graham subsequently abandoned his claim against the city. See id. at
1865.
23 Id. at 1868.
24 Id. at 1869. In reviewing the motion, the district court applied a substantive
due process standard to analyze Graham's excessive force claim. Id. at 1868-69.
The court determined that the force was applied in good faith, and therefore, ruled
that the incident did not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Id.

25 Id. at 1869.
26 Freyermuth, supra note 6, at 693 (recognizing that only the Seventh Circuit
had rejected substantive due process analysis of excessive force claims during arrest
in Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987)).
27 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988).
28 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. at 1865, 1870-71 (1989).
29 Id.
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tial to recognize the jurisprudential dichotomy in the application
of the Bill of Rights to federal and state criminal justice. The
Supreme Court has traditionally applied the fourth amendment
to federal actions.30 The fourth amendment, however, was repeatedly held inapplicable to the states. 31 To compensate, the
Court incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause those rights which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.3 2 It was in this environment that the Court
decided, in Rochin v. California,33 whether the admission of evidence that was illegally obtained was violative of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.34
In Rochin, the State of California had prosecuted an individual for possession of morphine.35 The State's key evidence was
two capsules containing morphine which were obtained by
pumping the petitioner's stomach. 36 The petitioner was convicted in spite of his objection that the evidence was illegally ob3
tainedY.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the evidence was obtained in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.38 Specifically, the Court refused to make the constitutional protections of
30 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886).
31 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 26. Justice Frankfurter opined that "[t]he notion that the
'due process of law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is short hand for
the first eight amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has
been rejected by this Court again and again, after impressive consideration." Id.
(citations omitted).
32 Id. at 27. The expression "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was first
used by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
While the Wolf Court refused to incorporate the provisions of the fourth
amendment, the Court determined that arbitrary intrusion into a citizen's privacy
by the police is prohibited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
33 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
34 Id. at 168. Three years prior to Rochin, the Court in Wolf ruled that "in a
prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not
forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33.
35 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 172. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Rochin, opined:
The faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and
vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each
case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of
facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of
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the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.3 9
Nine years after Rochin, the Court applied the fourth amendment to the states via the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v.
Ohio.4" In Mapp, the appellant was convicted in a state court of
knowingly possessing lewd books, despite the fact that the evidence was obtained by an unreasonable search.4 ' In reversing
the conviction, the Mapp Court overruled prior decisions that
permitted the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the
due process clause.4 2 Thus, the Court determined that the evidence was inadmissible in a state court, thereby making the entire fourth amendment applicable to the states. 43
The Supreme Court further extended the fourth amendment
in Terry v. Ohio.4 4 The petitioner in Terry was convicted of possession of concealed weapons which were seized by an officer during
a stop and frisk. 4 5 The Court recognized that the fourth amendment governs all seizures of individuals by police officers. 4 6
ChiefJustice Warren, writing for the majority, also reasoned that
a seizure occurs whenever there is a restraint on the liberty of an
individual by either a show of authority or by physical force.4 7
Consequently, the Court rejected the notion that the fourth
reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive
society.
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the
present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by
which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Id. (citation omitted).
39 See id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring).
40 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41 Id. at 645.
42 Id. at 654-55.
43 Id. at 655. The provisions of the fourth amendment had been made applicable to the states in Wolf, but evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was held admissible in a state proceeding, even though it would not be
admissible in a federal proceeding. Id. Mapp overruled Wolf to the extent that the
evidence would be inadmissible in state and federal courts. Id. at 654-55.
44 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
45 Id. at 30-31.
46 Id. at 16. The majority stated:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-arrests in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.
Id.
47 Id. at 19 n.16.
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amendment does not apply until there has been an arrest.4 8 The
Terry Court reiterated that the fourth amendment applies to people, not merely to places.4 9 The Court reasoned, however, that
the petitioner was protected only against unreasonable searches
and seizures.50
Turning to the issue of reasonableness, the Terry Court ruled
that the officers' actions must be judged against an objective
standard. 5 ' Further, the majority endorsed, as the proper test of
reasonableness, the balancing of the need for the seizure against
the intrusion which the seizure entails. 52 In upholding the conviction, the Court concluded that the governmental interest at
stake outweighed the invasion upon the constitutionally protected rights of the petitioner.5 3
Six years following Terry, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit applied the Rochin substantive due process
test to a pre-trial detainee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of brutality
by a prison guard.5 4 In Johnson v. Glick,5 5 the majority declined to
apply either the fourth or the eighth amendment to a claim by a
post-arrest, pre-trial detainee. 56 The court instead applied the
Rochin substantive due process test, holding that the use of excessive force by law officers deprived a detainee of liberty without
48

Id. at 19.

49

Id. at 9 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).

50

Id.

51 Id. at 21. The Court justified the standard as follows:
[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action taken was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. And simple " 'good faith on the part of the arresting
officer is not enough .

. . .'

If subjective good faith alone were the test,

the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police."
Id. at 21-22 (citations and footnotes omitted).
52 Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967)).
53 Id.
54 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1032-33. The court posited that "[t]he solution lies in the proposition
that, both before and after sentence, constitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct violating the specific command of the Eighth Amendment or, as in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), of the Fourth." Id. at 1032.
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5 7 The court relied
OTE
affording1990]
him due process of law.
on the 57
fact
that most lower federal courts dealing with claims of undue force
by pre-trial detainees had utilized the due process clause in their
S1 58
inquiries.
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, next formulated a
test to determine whether the due process clause had been violated. 59 The court posited that courts must consider whether the
force was applied in good faith or whether it was applied maliciously for the purpose of causing harm. 60 After the decision in
Glick, the majority of federal courts have applied Glick's due process test to all claims of excessive force. 6 '
In 1985, the United States Supreme'Court in Tennessee v. Garner,6 2 announced that apprehension by deadly force constitutes a
seizure subject to analysis under the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. 63 Justice White, writing for the majority,
focused on the reasons for abandoning the common law rule permitting the use of whatever force was necessary to stop a fleeing
felon, 64 and considered the new standard to evaluate the use of
deadly force to effect an arrest. 65 In particular, the Court affirmed the application of the fourth amendment's reasonableness
test to any restraint on an individual's liberty, as well as the use of
the balancing test to determine whether a seizure is reasonable.6 6

Id.
Id. at 1033 (citing Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971);Jones v. Wittenberg,
323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)).
59 Id.
60 Id. The majority stated:
In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court
must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used,
the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Id.
61 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989).
62 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
63 Id. at 7.
64 Id. at 12.
65 Id. at 11. The Court opined that "[w]here the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer
or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force." Id.
66 Id. at 7-8. Justice White stated that "[t]o determine the constitutionality of a
seizure 'we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests
57
58
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Acknowledging the dual nature of a seizure, the majority opined
that reasonableness depends not only on when the seizure occurs, but also on how it is executed.6 7 Thus, the Garner Court
held that the fourth amendment commands that in order to seize
a person a police officer must be reasonable in his belief that the
person has committed a crime and reasonable in the manner in
which the seizure was conducted. 68
While the fourth amendment standard was applied in Terry69
and Garner,70 the Court had yet to expressly provide when that
standard was appropriate. Recognizing that federal courts were
applying different standards to excessive force claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor 7 ' addressed the excessive force analysis of the
seizure of a free citizen.7 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Graham,
first rejected the idea that all § 1983 excessive force claims must
be analyzed by a single generic standard.7 3 The Court posited
that many courts had incorrectly assumed that a right to be free
from excessive force existed independently under § 1983,
although not grounded in any specific constitutional provision. 4
In rejecting this notion, ChiefJustice Rehnquist emphasized that
prior decisions had made it clear that § 1983 does not confer any
substantive rights, but simply provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights. 75 The majority established that the first
step in addressing a § 1983 excessive force claim was to determine which constitutional right had allegedly been infringed.7 6
The Court noted that this constitutional provision will usually be
alleged to justify the intrusion.' " Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 703 (1983)).
67 Id. (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968)).
68
69
70

Id. at 7-8.

73
74

Id.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985).
71 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989).
72 Id. at 1870.

Id. (quotingJustice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 109 S.Ct. 2461 (1989) (case remanded in light of Graham)).
75 Id. The Court opined "as we have said many times, [§ ] 1983 'is not itself a
source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.' " Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144
n.3 (1979)).
76 Id. In support of this conclusion the Graham Court relied on Baker, 443 U.S. at
140, which determined that the first inquiry in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) action is
to isolate the precise constitutional violation. Graham, 109 S.Ct. at 1870.
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either the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable
seizures, or the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 77 As a result, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that a free citizen's claim of excessive force during an
investigative stop is properly analyzed under the fourth amendment which provides an explicit source of constitutional protection. 78 In support of this conclusion, the Court relied upon its
ruling in Garner which analyzed, solely under a fourth amendment standard, the constitutionality
of applying deadly force to
79
apprehend a fleeing felon.
The majority declined to resolve the question of whether excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees should be analyzed under a fourth amendment standard. 80 The Court did,
however, observe that in such a context the due process clause
prohibits excessive force if it amounts to punishment.8 ' Further,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist explained that subsequent to the defendant's conviction the eighth amendment is the proper standard of
analysis because after conviction due process protection is
merely redundant.8 2
The Garner Court next affirmed the use of the balancing test
to determine whether the force used was reasonable.8 3 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that prior cases had recognized the right to
Id.
Id.
79 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that the petitioner in Garner had alleged both a fourth amendment and a due process clause violation. Id. at 1871.
The Graham majority stated:
Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis, and hold
that all claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive forcedeadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive
due process' approach.
Id. (emphasis in original).
80 Id. at 1871 n.10.
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that "[a]ny protection that 'substantive due process' affords convicted
prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment." Id.
83 Id. at 1871. ChiefJustice Rehnquist opined that "[d]etermining whether the
force used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 703 (1983)).
77
78
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use some degree of force to effect a seizure. 8 4 Thus, the majority
emphasized that the test of reasonableness demands careful attention to the facts and circumstances presented in each particular case.8 5 Specifically, the Court ruled that the reasonableness
of each individual use of force should be judged from the viewpoint of a reasonable police officer on the scene, instead of with
the perfect vision of hindsight.8 6 Consequently, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that every push or shove does not violate
the fourth amendment.8 7 The Court further recognized that allowance must be made for the fact that police officers are frequently forced to make instantaneous decisions concerning the
amount of force required in a particular situation. 8
The Garner Court determined that all fourth amendment inquiries must be reviewed under an objective standard. 9 Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed that an officer's subjective motivations have no bearing on whether a seizure is reasonable. 90 Consequently, the majority concluded that the court of appeals erred
in its analysis because the court applied the Glick test, which required consideration of the individual officers' subjective motivations.9 1 The Court ruled that any consideration of subjective
motivation was incompatible with a proper fourth amendment

analysis .92
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the court of appeals' sugId. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
Id. at 1871-72. The Court noted that the factors for courts to consider include "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 1872.
86 Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 1).
87 Id. (quotingJohnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
88 Id. The majority here appears to incorporate the dissenting opinion in Garner,
where Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
stated that "[t]he Court's silence on critical factors in the decision to use deadly
force simply invites second-guessing of difficult police decisions that must be made
quickly, in the most trying of circumstances." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 32
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (citing Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
90 Id. The Graham Court did note that an officer's subjective motivations might
be considered "in assessing the credibility of the officer's account of the circumstances that prompted the use of force." Id. at 1873 n.12.
91 Id. at 1872 (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). The test applied in Glick required a determination of whether the "force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm." Id.
92 Id.
84
85
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gestion that conduct which was malicious and sadistic was the
equivalent of objectively unreasonable conduct. 93 The Supreme
Court characterized this analogy as making relevant the individual officer's subjective motivations." Because these motivations
have no bearing on a fourth amendment inquiry, the majority
ruled that the court of appeals reviewed the district court's grant
of a directed verdict under an erroneous standard.95 The Court
also rejected the conclusion that because the officer's subjective
motivations were of central importance in an eighth amendment
inquiry, it could not be reversible error to merely consider them
in a fourth amendment inquiry. 9 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist pos-

ited that different standards apply because the Constitution
97
couched the two amendments' prohibitions in different terms.
In particular, the majority stressed that the terms "cruel" and
"punishment" clearly suggest some inquiry into one's subjective
state of mind, whereas the term "unreasonable" does not.9 8 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the eighth amendment is less
protective and that it only applies after conviction. 99
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by preserving the question of whether an officer's good faith belief that he had not violated the fourth amendment had any bearing on the availability
of a qualified immunity defense to an action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.100 Because the qualified immunity defense had

not been raised, the Court declined to express a view on its relevance in a fourth amendment excessive force inquiry.' 0 '
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, refused to adopt the Court's holding that
all excessive force claims raised by free citizens were to be analyzed under the fourth amendment.1 2 The concurrence contended that the choice of analysis was properly left to the party as
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1872-73.
Id. at 1873 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that 'Jilt is unreasonable, however, to suggest that a conceptual factor could be central to one type of
excessive force claim but reversible error when merely considered by the court in
another context." Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 948 n.3 (4th Cir.
1987).
97 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. at 1865, 1873 (1989).
93
94
95
96

98 Id.

99 Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)).

100 Id. at 1873 n.12 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).

101 Id.
102 Id. at 1873 (BlackmunJ., concurring).
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a matter of litigation strategy. 0 3 Justice Blackmun advocated
leaving the question of whether substantive due process is applicable to a pre-arrest case until the court was faced with a situation where the force applied
was reasonable, thereby satisfying
0 4
the fourth amendment.1

Justice Blackmun's concurrence further contested the majority's suggestion that the Court's decision in Garnerimplicitly held
that all claims of excessive force in effecting a seizure were to be
analyzed under the fourth amendment. 105 Justice Blackmun
noted that the use of a substantive due process standard was
neither discussed, nor rejected
as the proper method of analysis
6
0

in the Garner opinion.1

The concurrence agreed with the Court's ruling that the
fourth amendment acts as the primary tool in the analysis of excessive force claims in the pre-arrest context. 10 7 Justice Blackmunjoined the majority in their judgment to remand the case for
reconsideration of the petitioner's allegations under a reasonableness standard.' 08
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, the
Court utilized the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to invalidate state action that deprived an individual of liberty without due process of law. 109 The lower federal courts
adopted the Glick substantive due process test and, lacking direction from the Supreme Court, "l0 continued to apply it indiscrimiId. at 1874 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
Id. Justice Blackmun, aware that the case came to the Court following a directed verdict, noted:
[T]he Court would have done better to leave that question for another
day. I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substantive due
process concerns. But until I am faced with a case in which that question is squarely raised, and its merits are subjected to adversary presentation, I do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process
analysis in pre-arrest cases.
Id.
105 Id. at 1873-74 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471
103

104

U.S. 1 (1985)).
106

Id. at 1874 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

i07 Id. at 1873 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
108 Id.

109 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (utilizing due process
clause of fourteenth amendment to reverse conviction based on evidence obtained
from petitioner's person by a stomach pump).
llO SeeJohnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973). In Glick, the Supreme Court denied certiorari after the court of appeals
analyzed a pre-trial detainee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) excessive force claim under
a substantive due process standard. Id.

1990]

NOTE

579

nately to all claims of constitutionally excessive force brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' Graham provided the Court with an
opportunity to determine what standard governed claims that law
enforcement officials used excessive force in effecting a seizure of
a free citizen. 1 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist and a majority of the
Court responded that all such claims must be analyzed under the
1
objective reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment. 3
In so ruling, the majority reconciled the jurisprudence of the
lower federal courts with that of the Supreme Court.
The Court's ruling in Graham makes explicit what should
have been apparent since Mapp. Namely, the fourth amendment
prohibits all unreasonable seizures by law enforcement officials
and, consequently, the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard governs all pre-arrest excessive force claims. The use of a
substantive due process standard, although necessary before
Mapp, has no place in modern constitutional jurisprudence. As
the Graham Court observed, the fourth amendment provides "an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection," 14 and therefore, it should be utilized by the courts when considering an improper seizure.
The unfortunate confusion in the federal courts is a part of
the legacy left by the pre-Warren Court's chronic reluctance to
find the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.' ' The lower federal courts' previous reliance upon a substantive due process
standard owes itself to the Court's reluctance to incorporate the
fourth amendment into the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. Indeed, before Graham, the Court left the area of excessive force claims brought by post-arrest, pre-trial detainees to the
protections of the due process clause. Specifically, in Rochin, the
Court applied a substantive due process analysis to allegations of
an improper seizure by a state official." 6 The Rochin substantive
due process analysis, a product of the Court's resistance to incorporation, was used by the court of appeals in Glick." 7 The
Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in Glick, thereby
giving tacit approval to the court of appeals' utilization of the
II

Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989).
Id. at 1867.
'13 Id.
1'4 Id. at 1871.
115 See Freyermuth, supra note 6, at 707.
116 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
117 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973).
112
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substantive due process test in the pre-trial detainee context."18
The Court's failure to provide direction in that instance precipitated the lower federal courts' application of the substantive due
process standard in all excessive force actions which arose under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, the Graham Court did not reach the
question of what standard to apply to excessive force claims
brought by pre-trial detainees.' 19 As a consequence, the ruling
in Graham shed little light on the proper standard to assess a pretrial detainee's claim unless the excessive force "amounts to punishment," thereby implicating the due process clause.120 Thejudicial restraint exercised by the Court in Graham is reminiscent of
the Court's denial of certiorari in Glick. While the holding in Graham mandates the use of the objective reasonableness standard to
assess excessive force claims by free citizens, thereby clarifying
that area, the circuit and district courts are left to grope at substantive due process when analyzing pretrial detainees' excessive
force claims.
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun aptly identified that
some plaintiffs might prefer to invoke the protections of substantive due process.'21 Justice Blackmun, however, failed to address
the fact that the lower federal courts have been applying the substantive due process test indiscriminately to all § 1983 excessive
force claims, regardless of the circumstances under which they
arose. In this regard, the majority opinion in Graham made practical sense. The fourth amendment does, as the majority noted,
provide explicit, rather than generalized, constitutional protection. 122 By its plain language, the amendment should govern all
claims of excessive force in effecting a seizure. The majority's
ruling in Graham clearly set forth a standard and consequently
guaranteed that the same constitutional standard will be applied
uniformly by all the federal courts; a result that the concurrence
would not have achieved.
The concurrence did raise an important issue by alluding 12to
the fact that the Graham case was not fully and fairly litigated.
Consequently, the Court did not have the opportunity to put the
stamp of constitutional approval on the facts that will be determined on remand. As a result, the lower courts have no new ex118 See Johnson v. Glick, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).

119 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 n.10 (1989).
120

Id.

121
122
123

Id. at 1874 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 1871.
Id. at 1874 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra note 104.
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ample of objective reasonableness and are limited to the
Supreme Court's decisions in Terry 124 and Garner 12 5 to guide
them.
The holding in Graham nonetheless guaranteed that the petitioner's claim will be reviewed on remand against the more protective fourth amendment and its objective reasonableness
standard. 126 Furthermore, the ruling apprised free citizens of the
standard by which their excessive force claims, lodged under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, will be adjudicated. Any loss in substantive rights
occasioned by the Graham decision is more than offset by the increased protection that the fourth amendment will provide in the
vast majority of cases.
Paul G. Gizzi
124 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (utilizing fourth amendment to analyze constitutionality of police officer's stop and frisk). For a discussion of the Terry decision, see supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
125 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (utilizing fourth amendment to ana-

lyze constitutionality of police officer's use of deadly force to seize a fleeing felon).
For a discussion of the Garner decision, see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text.
126 Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1873.

